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Mark Murphy. God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of 
Morality. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Suppose that God exists; what is the relationship between God and 
morality? In his sharp new book, mark murphy criticizes two prominent 
ways of answering this question (theological voluntarism and ‘standard’ 
natural law theory) and expounds a striking new answer. Along the way, 
he examines the nature of moral law and moral obligation. murphy’s 
book constitutes an excellent companion to robert Adams’s masterpiece 
Finite and Infinite Goods as murphy draws on some aspects of Adams’s 
Platonic theistic approach to ethics while at the same time subjecting 
Adams’s view to insightful criticism. The primary audience for murphy’s 
book is philosophers interested in theistic ethics, but it (along with 
Adams’s book) ought to be read by anyone interested in meta-ethics, 
for at least two reasons. First, it includes a number of important claims 
and arguments about moral laws and moral obligation that, if correct, 
have implications far beyond theistic ethics. Second, defenders of secular 
approaches to ethics can learn much by examining the best theistic 
approaches to ethics and considering their strengths and weaknesses.
To get a sense of the structure of the central argument of God and 
Moral Law, imagine a piece of cotton slowly moving closer and closer 
to an open flame. When the cotton is very near to the flame, it begins 
to burn, and eventually is entirely consumed. Suppose that God exists; 
what role, if any, does God play in this transaction? According to mere 
conservationism, God is responsible for keeping the cotton and the flame 
in existence, but it is the nature of the cotton and the flame that directly 
explain the consumption of the former by the latter. one worry about 
this view is that it does not do justice to God’s sovereignty. on this view, 
God is too much in the background; as murphy puts it, ‘what happens 
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between the fire and the cotton is ... entirely between the fire and the 
cotton’ (p.  135). According to occasionalism, God is the immediate 
and complete cause of the burning of the cotton; the proximity of the 
cotton to the flame is merely the occasion for God bringing it about that 
the cotton burns. This view puts God right at the centre of things and 
appears to preserve His sovereignty. However, an opposite worry arises 
for this view, as it appears to imply (implausibly) that the fire does not 
cause the cotton to burn.
Now imagine some sadistic hooligans bullying a helpless child. This 
act is morally wrong; it is morally necessary that it not be performed. 
Again, suppose that God exists; what role, if any, does God play in 
explaining the moral wrongness of this act? Corresponding to mere 
conservationism is the view that God is responsible for keeping the 
act and its wrongness in existence, but it is the natural features of the 
act itself that morally necessitate that it not be performed. According 
to murphy, this is the essence of standard natural law theory, and it 
suffers from the defect of failing to do justice to God’s sovereignty. God 
is too much in the background here; He is not part of the immediate 
explanation for the wrongness of the act (p.  74). Corresponding to 
occasionalism is theological voluntarism, the view that an  act that is 
(or is partially constituted by) a  divine willing is the immediate and 
complete explanation for the moral wrongness of the act; the natural 
features of the act are morally inert. but according to murphy, the view 
‘[t]hat natural facts have no active normative power is on its face deeply 
objectionable’ (p. 119).
Perhaps there is a  middle way. In the case of the cotton and the 
flame, perhaps we should say that the burning of the cotton ‘is jointly 
attributable to God and the fire’ (p. 146). Similarly, perhaps in the case of 
the hooligans and the child, we should say that the moral wrongness of 
the act is immediately explained both by God and certain natural features 
of the act itself. The centrepiece of murphy’s book is a working out of 
this third option, moral concurrentism (murphy takes this to be a version 
of natural law theory; hence his use of the label ‘standard natural law 
theory’ for the type of natural law theory he rejects).
According to moral concurrentism, ‘moral necessitation  ... is 
immediately explained both by God and by creaturely natures’, and ‘this 
is not overdetermination, but cooperation: they somehow jointly morally 
necessitate’ (p. 148). but how does this work? To answer that question, 
murphy first draws on Adams’s suggestion that the goodness of finite 
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things consists in their resembling God in a particular way. employing 
a delectable example that involves murphy turning into a chicken fried 
steak (the delicious details of which I  won’t reveal here; see p.  155), 
murphy argues that Adams’s view on goodness should be modified so 
that it says that ‘no created thing is simply good; it is always X-ly good 
(or bad), where the X is filled in by the kind to which the thing belongs ... 
whenever a being belongs to some kind, then the standards for excellence 
for that thing are fixed in part by its kind’ (p. 159). The resulting view 
has it that the goodness of finitely good things consists in their ‘being 
like God in ways that belong to the kind to be like God’  – a  ‘theistic 
Aristotelianism’ in contrast with Adams’s theistic Platonism. So, on 
Adams’s view, if I taste like a well-prepared chicken fried steak, then this 
is an excellence in me, whereas on murphy’s view it is not because tasting 
like a well-prepared chicken fried steak is not an excellence of human 
being, the kind to which I belong (p. 155).
With this account of goodness in hand, murphy develops a  theory 
of moral necessitation, a property that, according to murphy, is closely 
related to, though perhaps not identical with, moral obligation (see 
pp. 166-172 for murphy’s discussion of the relationship between moral 
necessitation and moral obligation). murphy proposes that moral 
necessitation is grounded in the goodness and badness of finite things; 
these goods and evils sometimes ‘demand a  response’ (p.  162). Since 
the goodness of finite goods consists in their resembling God in a way 
suitable to their kind, we can say that ‘on moral concurrentism all moral 
necessity is the pull of divine goodness specified by the nature of the 
creatures involved’ (p.  162). In this way, God and creaturely natures 
cooperate to explain moral necessitation. To return to the case of the 
sadists bullying the child, the goodness of the child (and/or its life) – its 
resemblance to God in a way suitable to its kind – morally necessitates 
that the child not be bullied.
The problem with standard natural law theory is that it implies that 
‘God is not an immediate explainer of moral necessitation’ (p. 164). moral 
concurrentism avoids this problem by claiming that what necessitates 
is resembling God in a  way suitable to one’s kind. The problem with 
theological voluntarism is it ‘excludes creaturely natures from having 
an  immediate explanatory role in moral necessitation’ (p.  164). moral 
concurrentism avoids this problem by claiming that what necessitates is 
resembling God in a way suitable to one’s kind.
202 booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
As a  defender of secular approaches to ethics, I  feel some kind of 
necessitation (perhaps moral, perhaps not) to offer some critical remarks 
about murphy’s worthy book. To that end, consider the distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic value, a  distinction explored most 
famously by G.e. moore. on the moorean conception, the intrinsic value 
of a thing is the value it has ‘in and of itself ’ or entirely in virtue of its 
(non-evaluative) intrinsic properties. extrinsic value, by contrast, is the 
value a thing has in virtue of how it is related to other things. It seems to 
me that the ‘in virtue of ’ relation here is best conceived of as explanatory 
in nature, so that we can say that when something is intrinsically good, it 
is the thing’s non-evaluative intrinsic properties (or some proper subset 
thereof) that make it good. on this conception of intrinsic goodness, 
murphy’s view (as well as Adams’s) implies that nothing distinct from 
God is intrinsically good. This is because, on murphy’s (and Adams’s) 
view, the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing 
in a certain relationship to God; their goodness is thus extrinsic rather 
than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by their intrinsic 
properties but also by certain properties of God. This points to a possible 
weakness in murphy’s view. I take it that one way of testing the adequacy 
of a  given theory of morality is to examine how well it accords with 
our common-sense moral beliefs. While our common-sense moral 
beliefs are not indefeasible, the fact that a given theory is at odds with 
such beliefs is a  strike against that theory. Indeed, murphy appears to 
take such an  approach himself. As I  noted above, one of his primary 
criticisms of theological voluntarism is that it implies that ‘natural facts 
have no active normative power’ (p. 119). To motivate the implausibility 
of this claim, murphy invites the reader to consider the act of harming 
a harmless child, noting that theological voluntarism ‘closes off the good 
of the child’s life from being the, or even a, wrongmaking feature of the 
harming’ (p. 118). This looks to be an appeal to our common-sense moral 
beliefs; specifically, to our belief that the fact that the child’s life is good is 
at least part of what makes it wrong to harm the child. murphy classifies 
this objection to theological voluntarism as an ‘explanandum-centered’ 
objection (p. 116) in that it alleges that theological voluntarism is unable 
to explain certain facts about morality (namely, that natural facts are not 
normatively inert).
I  suggest that among our common-sense moral beliefs is the belief 
that some things distinct from God are intrinsically good: for example, 
the pleasure of an  innocent backrub, or the love between parent and 
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child. These things, it seems to me, are good in and of themselves. What 
makes them good, what explains their goodness, lies entirely within their 
intrinsic nature. If there are such intrinsic goods, then it appears that 
neither murphy’s nor Adams’s theory can account for them, and this is 
a strike against both theories. This is an explanandum-centred challenge 
to Adams’s and murphy’s accounts of the goodness of finite things.
Whatever the merits of this criticism, murphy has written a book very 
much worth reading. by way of conclusion, I should emphasize that the 
book contains a number of stimulating arguments beyond those I have 
sketched here. In particular, murphy offers some novel challenges for 
standard natural law theory and theological voluntarism that defenders 
of those approaches will want to consider – though whether murphy’s 
arguments will ‘settle’ the theological voluntarists as he suggests they 
should (p. 132) remains to be seen.
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Charles Taliaferro, Jil Evans. The Image in Mind: Theism, Naturalism, 
and the Imagination. Continuum, 2011.
The Image in Mind: Theism, Naturalism, and the Imagination is an attempt 
to bring a  previously underemphasized consideration to the forefront 
of the theism-naturalism debate: the comparative aesthetic value of 
opposed worldviews. The authors, Charles Taliaferro and Jil evans, 
endeavour to shift our attention away from the more directly evidential 
questions that currently dominate the theism vs. naturalism literature 
toward such questions as ‘What is beautiful or ugly, deep or superficial, 
extravagant or empty, illuminating or stultifying about these images’ 
(p. 1)? Whether naturalism can account for the emergence of specifically 
aesthetic values is a theme tracked throughout the book, but Taliaferro 
and evans are equally interested in the prospects of naturalistic accounts 
of the emergence of ‘ ... life, sentience, consciousness, free will, and moral, 
aesthetic, and religious experience through non-purposive, impersonal 
forces’ (p. 3). They offer substantial discussions of each of these issues, 
and in doing so they employ an aesthetic mode of evaluation. Despite its 
relative brevity, The Image in Mind competently treats this broad sweep 
